Jerusalem Journeys, (excerpt from Chapter 10)

Sir Herbert Samuel Takes on an Impossible Task

Background Discussion: Taking Sides

Activity: Considering Zionism

 

Background Discussion - Taking Sides

When the British Government was discussing the question of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, there was a very difficult atmosphere in the Cabinet.

The majority of its top members had been "converted" to a belief in the desirability of the issuance of the Declaration by a number of different factors.

There were those for whom issues of imperial logic were decisive. For these, the Jews in a Jewish homeland in Palestine would prove extremely valuable allies in the future, and would help safeguard British interests in the region, especially bearing in mind the importance that the British attached to the Suez Canal in Egypt.

But there were other less interested factors at play here, too. There were many religious Christians in England who felt a genuine religious debt to the Jews, and who felt, moreover, that Christianity had dealt badly with the Jews over time. There were those who felt a profound attachment to the Land of the Bible, and who felt that a biblical justice would be served by the encouragement of Jews to return to their native land.

For all these reasons, the Zionist movement led by Chaim Weizmann felt fairly confident that now, with the British army on its way to Palestine, the time was right to receive a British commitment to the idea of a Jewish homeland in the land about to come under British control.

But Zionism had its opponents. Not everyone in England liked the idea of Zionism. There were those who believed that the Middle East was an Arab area, and that British interests would be served best by an exclusive alliance with the Arabs; such people were naturally opposed to Zionism.

There was, however, another very different group that worried the Zionists far more. This was a group in the heart of the English establishment that was desperately opposed to Zionism; these were people who were prepared to go to great lengths to discredit this idea of Jewish nationality in a historic homeland. These people were Jews. They were representatives of the Jewish aristocracy, composed of families, like the Samuels or the Montefiores, who had migrated to Britain generations previously, and had come to think of themselves as intensely English. Like most of the longer time Jews in England, they saw themselves, as Jews, as part of a religious group, but regarded their nationality as English. This group was passionately anti-Zionist; they viewed Zionism as something that distinctly threatened them. If support was gained for the opinion that Palestine was the land of the Jews, it could undermine all attempts by the group to convince their fellow-Englishmen that the Jews belonged to England as part of the English nation.

This group of Jews could severely threaten the Zionist cause. During the months that the issue was under consideration by the government, the Jewish anti-Zionists indeed ran a concerted campaign in the press to discredit Zionism in general, and the identification of British interests with Zionism, in particular.

One of the representatives of the group sat in the British cabinet. He was Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India. When the issue of the adoption of the Balfour Declaration came up for discussion in the Cabinet, he used every argument to persuade the government to abandon the idea. 'It would be an affront to the Jewish community of England and would embarrass them'. The implication was clear: to pass the Declaration was to make the accusation of dual nationality or, even worse, of being a nation within a nation, loyal to another homeland.

Montagu managed to prevent the Declaration from being endorsed at its first discussion. At a second debate in the forum of the War Cabinet, two weeks later, Montagu struck again. The story is told in the memoirs of Chaim Weizmann.

"When the Palestine item was laid before the War Cabinet, Edwin Montagu made a passionate speech against the proposed move... There was nothing new in what he had to say, but the vehemence with which he urged his views, the implacability of his opposition, astounded the Cabinet. I understand the man almost wept.

When he had ended, Balfour (the Foreign Minister) and Lloyd George (the Prime Minister) suggested that I be called in, and messengers were sent for me. They looked for me high and low [but did not find me]... I missed a great opportunity.. Perhaps, however, it was better so. I might, in that setting, with Montagu in front of me, have said something harsh or inappropriate. I might have made matters worse instead of better."

From Chaim Weizmann, "Trial and Error"

Activity: Considering Zionism